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Journey Into Shame: Implications for Justice Pedagogies 
Roger C. Bergman, Creighton University 
 
Being formed for justice can be a painful experience. Sometimes that pain takes the form of shame and contributes 
to the formation and exercise of conscience. But shame in other forms can be opposed to human flourishing and 
social justice. Psychologist James Fowler provides a spectrum of two forms of healthy shame and four forms of 
unhealthy shame, to which the author adds four other varieties, strategic shame and spiritual shame, at one end of 
the spectrum, and murderous shame and genocidal shame, at the other. Various experiences of shame are 
dramatically illustrated in Black Like Me, John Howard Griffin’s classic narrative of racism in the Deep South. It is 
crucial for social justice educators to be able to discern among these forms of shame in their own experience and 
when reported by students, so that healthy forms can be sympathetically honored and unhealthy forms critically 
examined. 
 
In more than thirty years as a practitioner, I have learned that 
education for justice is all about the intimately personal risk 
that accompanies crossing borders -- national, geographic, 
cultural, class – and thereby discovering one’s privileged 
social location in a world of destitution. As my students say, 
it’s about getting out of your comfort zone and into a 
discomfort zone, such as a shelter for the homeless just 
blocks from your campus suite. Being formed for justice, 
undergoing a conversion to the cause of the oppressed, can 
be, perhaps must be, a painful experience. Sometimes that 
pain takes the form of shame, which, when found in the 
young, in Book IV, section 9, of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle (1999) called shame semi-virtue. Lest there be any 
misplaced resistance to the positive role that some forms of 
shame have to play in personal transformation and critical 
pedagogies, it is crucial to acknowledge the ways that other 
forms of shame can be negative and opposed to human 
flourishing and social justice. Theologian and psychologist 
James Fowler, author of the pioneering study, Stages of Faith: 
The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for 
Meaning (1981), provides an analytic spectrum of both good 
and bad forms of shame in his long essay, “Faith and the Fault 
Lines of Shame,” which appears as Part Two of Faithful 
Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern 




At one end of the spectrum we find healthy shame in two 
forms. Discretionary shame “protects those qualities of 
personhood that are grounds for esteem in the eyes of others 
and for honest confidence and pride in the self” (Fowler, 
1996, p. 105); discretionary shame is “premónitory and 
anticipatory” and depends upon the moral imagination to 
foresee how possible actions might play out (Fowler, 1996, p. 
106). Disgrace shame, on the other hand, is not anterior but 
posterior to a revealing act and “evolves as the painful set of 
emotions in which one feels exposed as unworthy, or as 
having failed to meet some set of standards necessary for the 
esteem of important others and of the self” (Fowler, 1996, p. 
106). Disgrace shame is more global than guilt, just as the 
pattern or trajectory of a life is distinguished from one action 
within that life. This suggests why I would be inclined to 
rename what Martin Hoffman (2000) calls “guilt over 
affluence” as “shame over previously unacknowledged 
privilege” (pp. 184-187). Both of these healthy forms, 
discretionary and disgrace shame, provide a foundation for 
moral self-identity. In many of the accounts of student 
experiences I have examined over the last decade or more, 
disgrace shame is clearly at work. One of the primary tasks of 
moral education is the fostering of healthy shame as a 
dimension of the well-formed conscience. 
 
These two forms of healthy shame are demonstrated in this 
student reflection on her experience volunteering at a 
residence for the elderly as part of a service-learning course:  
 
The other day I saw a man in his forties 
sitting outside the nursing home. He looked 
shabby and very rough. All I could think was 
to wonder why this man was standing 
around bothering the residents. He made 
me nervous. Then one of the residents 
called out to him with a big grin, and the 
man grinned back. I found out that the man 
is a construction worker in the area who 
comes to volunteer during his lunch hour 
and after work. The only other volunteer I 
have met at the home is a man named 
Donny, who I thought was a resident the 
first time I saw him. Donny does not look 
older than forty-five but is in a wheelchair 
and speaks slowly. There is something 
wrong with him physically. He volunteers 
more than twenty hours a week, and the 
residents know him by heart and love him. I 
am beginning to feel very ashamed of 
myself. Not only do I judge the residents, 
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but the other volunteers. While I am doing 
this they are helping each other attempt to 
live a better, more fulfilled life. As sick as I 
feel when I think of going, I am beginning to 
feel even worse at the idea of not going 
(quoted in Bergman, 2011, pp. 144-145). 
 
This honest and painful self-assessment expresses both 
disgrace shame – “I am beginning to feel very ashamed of 
myself,” and discretionary shame – “I am beginning to feel 
even worse at the idea of not going” (quoted in Bergman, 
2011, pp. 144-145). 
 
Because she is aware of being ashamed of her present 
attitudes, she can foresee that acting to avoid them in the 
future, by not returning to the site that provokes those 
attitudes and that shame, would cause an even more 
disturbing shame. It would be cowardly and selfish, she seems 
to imagine, to abandon people who themselves rise above the 
very impairments that scare her or whose appearance makes 
her nervous but whose generosity of self seems to accuse her. 
Whether one thinks of this as semi-virtuous or healthy shame, 
surely it is to be applauded and encouraged, even as one 





A very different kind of shame, perfectionist shame, often 
with roots in early childhood, is distorting and unhealthy. In 
thrall to the approval of important others, who may seem 
never to be satisfied, perfectionist shame limits access to the 
truth of one’s own experience and self-evaluation. Whereas 
healthy shame nurtures or protects a true self-identity, 
perfectionist shame creates a false self-identity, which is 
“reinforced by the parents, with the sanctions of religious and 
class ideals of moral superiority” (Fowler, 1996, pp. 114-115). 
This inflated form of shame lacks humility and compassion 
toward the self, conviction about the enormity of one’s own 
sins making forgiveness impossible.  
 
Ascribed shame, or “shame due to enforced minority status” 
(Fowler, 1996, p. 118), is another story altogether and is 
especially salient in justice education programs. It can be 
learned within a family of marginalized social status even 
before the child is exposed to the wider world. “It has little to 
do with the personal qualities of the family or their children. 
It has everything to do with the social environment’s 
disvaluing of some qualities over which they have no control. 
Most potent among the forms of this type of ascribed shame 
are the distortions due to socioeconomic class, race, ethnic 
background, sometimes religion, and – most commonly – 
gender” (Fowler, 1996, p. 119). Two factors make this shame 
especially pernicious and difficult: it can exist alongside any of 
the other forms of shame on the spectrum, and it cannot be 
fully healed apart from addressing issues of social justice 
(Fowler, 1996, p. 121). 
 
The late Jesuit theologian Thomas Clarke (1988) used the 
term “cultural disparagement” to describe what Fowler calls 
ascribed shame. “Human dignity is most tragically affronted, 
not by material deprivation as such, but by every projection 
of contempt onto individuals and especially onto groups, on 
whatever basis” (Clarke, 1988, p. 96). Clarke expressed 
agreement with an insight of the U.S. Catholic bishops in their 
1986 pastoral letter on the economy: “The ultimate injustice 
is for a person or group to be actively treated or passively 
abandoned as if they were nonmembers of the human race” 
(No. 77). Clarke went on to observe that “what brings cultural 
disparagement to its peak as a truly demonic evil is its 
acceptance and interiorization by the scapegoated 
group…native Americans, black males, Jews, women, the 
handicapped or whoever…” (Clarke, 1988, p. 97). 
 
So the healthy shame privileged students might feel in a 
homeless shelter may be complicated by an awareness of the 
cultural disparagement or ascribed shame – the socially 
unjust shame -- they see in the shelter’s guests. One service-
learning student (Bergman, 2011, pp. 83-84) was painfully 
moved by the way her older affluent peers, the ladies of the 
Junior League, condescended to the women of a shelter for 
the homeless and thereby reinforced their ascribed shame. 
Feeling vicariously the ascribed shame of the shelter’s guests, 
a shame for which they were not responsible and which was 
an internalization of their oppression, it’s as if this young 
privileged woman also felt a variety of disgrace shame on 
behalf of her older peers in privilege, the shame they should 
have felt but did not. There is something powerful about the 
encounter between unjustly ascribed shame for poverty and 
healthy shame for previously unacknowledged privilege. 
 
Toxic shame, Fowler’s (1996, pp. 122-126) third form of 
unhealthy shame, arises in children whose families are 
dysfunctionally organized around a parent’s alcoholism or 
abusiveness. A false self must be constantly on display or at 
hand, playing by the rules that allow the dysfunction to 
remain publicly unchallenged and the alcoholic or abuser 
unaccountable for his behavior. The suppression of the true 
self’s suffering becomes poisonous. As toxic shame may often 
be present among the poor and marginalized, as both cause 
and consequence of their plight, our students may often 
encounter it hidden in the resentment of those they may 
expect to find appreciative of their presence and service.    
 
Finally, at the far end of the spectrum from healthy shame is 
shamelessness, or socio-pathology, the complete lack of 
empathy, respect, and conscience. Fowler (1996) gives as 
examples the political tyrants Stalin, Hitler, and Saddam 
Hussein, all of whose biographies reveal childhoods in which 
abusive or shut-off parents made the development of healthy 
shame an impossibility (pp. 126-131). True socio-pathology 
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being rare, I would not expect our students to be more likely 
to encounter it in one of our programs than anywhere else. 
They are more likely to be confounded by a prejudicial 
paucity of empathy for the poor on the part of the affluent, 
as in the case of the student volunteer, the homeless women, 
and the Junior Leaguers. 
 
Murderous and Genocidal Shame 
 
To Fowler’s taxonomy of unhealthy shame I would like to add 
another, which may make us think twice about the very 
notion of shamelessness. I will call this variety of painful 
emotion murderous shame, which is analyzed by psychiatrist 
James Gilligan in his book Violence: Reflections on a National 
Epidemic (1996). At the time of the publication of his book, 
Gilligan had spent twenty-five years treating and studying the 
lives and psyches of men responsible for the kinds of crime 
we think of as heinous and shameless. Yet however 
shameless these men may have been in their actions, as we 
normally understand that usage of the term, Gilligan claims 
that such extreme violence represents a desperate attempt 
to defend against the shame of being thought of as less than 
worthy as a man. Gilligan detects in such shame an absence 
of self-love and traces its evolution from overwhelming pain, 
as might be experienced in abuse as a child, to affective 
numbness, to virulent hate, to murder – which Gilligan 
understands as an attempt to kill the shame by killing a 
person who mirrors that shame back to the perpetrator.  
 
Like Fowler, Gilligan also makes reference to Hitler, not to his 
abusive childhood but to the source of his power over the 
German people. Gilligan (1996) observes that “Hitler came to 
power on the campaign promise to undo ‘the shame of [the 
Treaty] of Versailles [which ended World War I]” (p. 67). That 
national shame and humiliation was a prominent theme of 
Mein Kampf (Gilligan, 1996, p. 69, and p. 275, note 10). The 
logic of the “final solution,” if we can call it logic, went like 
this: “If we [Germans] destroy the Jews, we will destroy [our] 
shame – [so that] we cannot be shamed [any more]” (Gilligan, 
1996, p. 69).   When a people becomes subject to shame in 
this way, through the manipulation of an evil genius like 
Hitler, murderous, scapegoating shame can become 
genocidal. Shame, we might say, can become demonic not 
only in the internalization of disparagement as described by 
Clarke (1988), but also in its massive externalization, as 
understood by Gilligan (1996). Joseph Kahn (2013) observed 
that China’s shame and humiliation due to conquest by 
Britain and Japan in the 19th century fuelled its drive to 
develop economically in the 20th century. Patriotic shame 




Since reading Fowler (1996) I have come to take as my own 
the first sentence of his long essay on shame: “Now that I 
have eyes for it, I see it everywhere” (p. 91). In fact, I have 
come to see it in places Fowler did not. I see it in Jesus’ 
advocacy of nonviolence as described by Walter Wink, I see it 
in Richard Gregg’s discussion of the “mirror” of Gandhian 
satyagraha, I see it in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s analysis of 
three actual and one incipient moral revolutions. I will briefly 
describe each of these instances of what I think of as strategic 
shame, a third category to add to Fowler’s basic twofold 
taxonomy. We have not only the healthy, potentially 
enlivening shame of the conscience-driven person, who seeks 
to do away with the unhealthy, oppressive shame of the 
culturally disparaged, but also the link between the two, the 
strategy by which the satyagrahi or social justice advocate 
might address both the capacity for healthy shame in the 
oppressor and the capacity of the oppressed to unburden 
themselves of the unhealthy shame of their disparagement. 
 
Walter Wink on Matthew 5:38-41 
 
Walter Wink’s (1998) exegesis of Matthew 5:38-41 is well-
known to many advocates of nonviolence who operate out of 
a Christian commitment. This is the famous passage in the 
Sermon on the Mount where Jesus teaches his followers to 
resist not evil, to turn the other cheek, to give one’s inner 
garment as well as outer, and to go the second mile. Wink 
tells us that just about everything we think we know about 
this passage is wrong. Resist not evil?  Surely that can’t be 
right, for what does Jesus save his followers from if not evil?  
Wink argues persuasively that the sentence is better 
translated “Do not return evil for evil,” or “Do not return 
violence for violence.”  And then Wink unpacks the three tiny 
vignettes that exemplify what Jesus is suggesting as an 
alternative. Let me focus on just one (Wink, 1998, pp. 103-
106), as it best relates to my theme.  
 
A rich man has taken a poor man to court over an unpaid 
loan, for which the collateral is the poor man’s robe, perhaps 
his most important possession. Deuteronomy 24:10-13 
stipulates that when such a garment is taken as collateral it 
must be returned every night for use as a bedroll. Now the 
debtor is demanding that the robe be awarded to him 
permanently as payment of the poor man’s debt. Jesus 
admonishes the debtor to give his under garment as well, to 
strip himself in the public court. Here’s how Wink (1998) 
explains Jesus’ shocking counsel: “Nakedness was taboo in 
Judaism, and shame fell less on the naked party than on the 
person viewing or causing the nakedness….By stripping, the 
debtor has brought shame on the creditor” (pp. 104). In a 
kind of moral ju-jitsu, the surprising behavior of the 
oppressed man has turned the tables on the rich man. His 
greed has been exposed in the naked destitution of the poor 
man. Jesus makes shaming of the uncaring rich a part of his 
public ministry on behalf of the reign of God. Jesus counsels 
the poor to use what I am calling strategic shame to claim 
their dignity, self-respect, and social standing—to shame 
their way out of their shame. A similar dynamic is operative in 
the famous episode of the woman caught in adultery (John 
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8:2-11), when Jesus turns the tables on her accusers: “Let he 
who is without sin cast the first stone.” 
 
Richard Gregg on Gandhian satyagraha 
 
Terrence Rynne (2008), in his Gandhi and Jesus: The Saving 
Power of Nonviolence, sees something similar at work in 
Richard Gregg’s analysis of Gandhian satyagraha as a mirror 
held up to the violent or oppressive party. According to 
Rynne (2008), “Gregg quotes the eminent psychiatrist Carl 
Rogers to the effect that people never change their habits of 
thinking, acting or feeling unless something happens that 
changes their picture of themselves…’The suffering of the 
satyagraha is as it were, a mirror held up to the violent party, 
in which the violent ones come gradually to see themselves 
as violating human unity and its implication….They sense the 
disapproval of the onlookers and wanting social approval, 
they begin to search for ways to save face [emphasis added]’” 
(pp. 71-72). Way is opened by the positive regard of the 
satyagrahi towards his opponent. He appeals to his sense of 
healthy shame, to his conscience. Responding out of this 
capacity, the oppressor reverses his public shame by ending 
the unjust, unhealthy shame of the oppressed, whose 
satyagraha or nonviolent suffering has offered the possibility 
of restoring honor to both parties. Strategic shame, because 
it appeals to the dignity of the oppressor through mirroring 
the dignity of the oppressed, is a form of love, an act of 
friendship toward the enemy. 
 
Kwame Anthony Appiah’s The Honor Code 
 
In The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, Kwame 
Anthony Appiah (2010) analyzes three major historical 
instances of nonviolent social change: the end of dueling and 
of the slave trade in early 19th century England and the end of 
female footbinding at the turn of the 20th century in China. 
Significantly, all of these movements occurred before or 
without reference to Gandhi’s “experiments with truth” in 
the late 19th  and first half of the 20th centuries. Appiah (2010) 
also applies prescriptively what he has learned from these 
case studies to the contemporary phenomenon of so-called 
“honor killings.”  Here I want to highlight briefly how Appiah 
sees what I’ve called strategic shame at work in these moral 
revolutions. 
 
Appiah (2010) writes that “one day, people will find 
themselves thinking not just that an old practice was wrong 
and a new one right but that there was something shameful 
in the old ways. In the course of the transition, many will 
change what they do because they are shamed out of an old 
way of doing things” (p. xvii). Shame is the contrary of honor: 
“To care for your honor is to want to be worthy of respect. If 
you realize you have done something that makes you 
unworthy, you feel shame whether or not anyone is 
watching” (Appiah, 2010, p. xviii). In the moral revolutions 
Appiah studies, honor was at first maintained by slaving, 
dueling, and footbinding. But each of these now abhorrent 
practices ended when these practices became shameful. The 
challenge is to moralize honor and shame, and to do so on 
behalf of universal human dignity and human rights. As 
Appiah (2010) puts it, “Honor isn’t shame; but the psychology 
it mobilizes can unquestionably be put in the service of 
human achievement” (p. 187). 
 
Appiah (2010) takes as one contemporary example a 
Pakistani woman whose story has been told by Nicholas 
Kristof of The New York Times (pp. 199-204). Muhktaran Bibi 
was sentenced by a village council to gang rape as 
punishment for an alleged assault on the honor of another 
family by 30-year-old Muhktaran’s 13-year-old brother. 
Normally a woman of Muhktaran’s lowly status would simply 
have suffered in silence, but in this case there was local and 
even international defiance. Muhktaran, as Appiah (2010) 
puts it, “rather than retreating in shame,…told [the police] 
her story”  (p. 201). As a result of this personal refusal to 
uphold one honor code, Muhktaran has helped to establish 
another. According to Appiah (2010), “Muhktaran Bibi has 
transformed her village and her country. The illiterate 
farmer’s daughter has become Muhktar Mai, Respected Elder 
Sister….Rather than hiding with the shame that her rapists 
meant to impose on her, she has exposed their depravity and 
insisted on justice, not only for herself but also for the 
women of her country” (p. 202). 
 
Journey Into Shame: A Case Study 
 
The main title of this paper, “Journey Into Shame,” replicates 
the title of the original series of seven Sepia magazine articles 
by John Howard Griffin (1960a, 1960b) that became one of 
the most influential and enduring books of the Civil Rights 
Era, Black Like Me. One of the book’s principal motifs is 
Griffin’s repeated encounter with his own image in a mirror. 
In his third such encounter, by which time he has observed 
the profound injustice of racial oppression and bigotry up 
close and personal, he reports an  
 
…onrush of revulsion, the momentary flash 
of blind hatred against the whites who were 
somehow responsible for all this, the old 
bewilderment of wondering, “Why do they 
do it?  Why do they keep us like this?  What 
are they gaining?  What evil has taken 
them?”  (The Negroes say, “What sickness 
has taken them?”)  My revulsion turned to 
grief [shame in 1960b, II, p. 51] that my own 
people could give the hate stare, could 
shrivel men’s souls, could deprive humans 
of rights they unhesitatingly accord their 
livestock” (1960a, pp. 66-67). 
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Griffin is revulsed to the point of hatred against whites and 
aggrieved and ashamed on their behalf, as a fellow white, for 
their shameful practice of shaming blacks so shamelessly.  
 
Griffin’s (1960a) repeated experience of the hate stare—
“Nothing can describe the withering horror of this” (p. 91), 
became the kernel of a recurring nightmare—“it was 
becoming such a profound personal experience, it haunted 
even my dreams” (p. 116), and led him to despair. “I realized 
that my despair came from sorrow for the whites, sorrow to 
find them sunk so deep in the quagmire of shame. Their 
attitude of bigotry and prejudice had carried them on a 
tangent so far from reason that it bore the marks of mass 
delusion”  (Griffin, 1960b, V, p. 33). But as sickening as was 
the hate stare, nothing so disturbed Griffin (1960a) as the 
sexualization of racial oppression he encountered especially 
when hitchhiking with white drivers in Mississippi: 
 
I must have had a dozen rides that 
evening….It quickly became apparent why 
they picked me up. All but two picked me up 
the way they would pick up a pornographic 
photograph or book—except that this was 
verbal pornography. With a Negro, they 
assumed they need give no semblance of 
self-respect or respectability….Some were 
shamelessly open, some shamelessly subtle. 
All showed morbid curiosity about the 
sexual life of the Negro, and all had, at base, 
the same stereotyped image of the Negro as 
an inexhaustible sex-machine with oversized 
genitals and a vast store of experiences, 
immensely varied….all that I could see here 
were men shorn of respect either for 
themselves or their companion (pp. 86-87). 
 
This sexual dimension of racism came home to Griffin (1960a) 
even more intimately when he tried to write a letter to his 
wife… 
 
I needed to write to her, to give her my 
news—but I found I could tell her nothing. 
No words would come….It was maddening. 
All my instincts struggled against the 
estrangement….My conditioning as a Negro, 
and the immense sexual implications with 
which the racists in our culture bombard us, 
cut me off, even in my most intimate self, 
from any connection with my wife.…The 
chains of my blackness would not allow me 
to go on. Though I understood and could 
analyze what was happening, I could not 
break through. Never look at a white 
woman—look down or the other way. What 
do you mean, calling a white woman 
‘darling’ like that, boy?”  (p. 68). 
 
So thoroughly has he internalized his black identity, and so 
powerfully was that identity a projection of white sexual 
obsession, Griffin the black man cannot overcome the 
imagined and fearful shame of speaking to a white woman, 
even by private letter, even when that woman was his wife. 
 
White shamelessness reached its most threatening climax in 
one particular encounter, when the white driver asked him 
 
“Do you know what we do with trouble-
makers down here?”   “No, sir.”  “We either 
ship you off to the pen or kill you”.…“You 
can kill a nigger and toss him into that 
swamp and no one would ever know what 
happened to him”….I forced myself to 
picture this man in his other roles. I saw him 
as he played with his grandchildren, as he 
stood up in church, as he drank a cup of 
coffee in the morning before dressing, as he 
visited with friends on the front porch. That 
was the man I had seen when I first got into 
the truck. The amiable, decent American 
was stamped on all his features. Yet now he 
had turned into an animal, cold and 
merciless. Surely not even his wife or closest 
friends had ever seen him like this. It was a 
side he would show no one but a Negro” 
(1960a, p. 104; 1960b, III, p. 37). 
 
His conduct in private conversation with a black, where 
shame was not operative, where bald viciousness had no 
limit, would have become shameful if known in polite white 
society—or so Griffin imagines, in an attempt almost to 
redeem the offender’s humanity. 
 
In one of the most intriguing forms shame takes in Black Like 
Me (1960a), Griffin makes use of his European experience 
during World War II to describe his experience in the Deep 
South. At a particularly low moment in his travels, Griffin 
(1960a) seeks refugee in the home of   
 
… the sympathetic white newspaper editor 
and personal friend P.D. East: “Once again 
the terrible truth struck me. Here in 
America, in this day, the simple act of whites 
receiving a Negro had to be a night thing 
and its aura of uneasiness had to be 
countered by gallows humor. What did we 
fear?  I could not say exactly. It was unlikely 
the Klan would come riding down on us. We 
merely fell into the fear that hangs over the 
state, a nameless and awful thing. It 
reminded me of the nagging, focusless fear 
we felt in Europe when Hitler began his 
marches, the terror of talking with Jews (and 
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our deep shame of it). For the Negro, at 
least, this fear is ever present in the South, 
and the same is doubtlessly true of many 
decent whites who watch and wait, and feel 
the deep shame of it” (p. 72).  
 
For fear of the Nazis, one didn’t talk with Jews, but one felt 
ashamed to become complicit in such vicious anti-Semitism. 
Griffin (1960a) imagines that many whites in America feel a 
similar fear about speaking out against racism but also a 
similar “deep shame” (p.72). 
 
Having given expression to healthy disgrace shame for white 
racism, an unhealthy ascribed shame, each of which he 
experiences as a man simultaneously white and black, Griffin 
(1960a) also sees how militant nonviolence can speak to the 
entire dynamic: 
 
In Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, I 
encountered a new atmosphere. The 
Negro’s feeling of utter hopelessness is here 
replaced by a determined spirit of passive 
resistance. The Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
influence, like an echo of Gandhi’s, prevails. 
Non-violent and prayerful resistance to 
discrimination is the keynote. Here the 
Negro has committed himself to a definite 
stand. He will go to jail, suffer any 
humiliation, but he will not back down. He 
will take the insults and abuses stoically so 
that his children may be spared them in the 
future. The white racist is bewildered and 
angered by such an attitude, because the 
dignity of the Negro’s course of action 
emphasizes the indignity of his own (p. 120). 
 
The antidote to shame is honor. By seeking a higher form of 
social relations not only as an end but as the morally requisite 
means, the nonviolent activist honors not only herself but her 
oppressor as well. Think of Muhktaran Bibi, in her new 
identity as Muhktar Mai, Respected Elder Sister. 
 
I conclude that the distance between virtue and vice, 
between justice and oppression, is measured by the kinds of 
shame active in any particular person. Healthy shame keeps 
us human and humane and nurtures moral flourishing; 
unhealthy shame suppresses our own deepest humanity and 
that of others, as John Howard Griffin came to realize so 
deeply. Strategic shame is the powerful link between the two. 
All of this has treated shame as a psychological or moral 
phenomenon. But there is one more category of shame that 
should not go unnoticed, especially in a Catholic university 
setting. Let me introduce this final type of shame through a 




At one point in recent years, it was our practice to attend 
mass on Sunday afternoon. That left the morning free for 
coffee on the porch while reading The New York Times and 
the local newspaper. Over a period of some weeks, I began to 
notice that by mid-morning, I was finding myself in a bit of a 
funk. So much bad news. So much contention, strife, 
suffering, scandal, betrayal, abuse, injustice, violence, war, 
even genocide. I found myself asking Mary Oliver’s (2012) 
question from “The Morning Paper:” “What keeps us from 
falling down, our faces / to the ground; ashamed, ashamed?” 
(p.63). After a few weeks of this, it dawned on me to put my 
funk in the context of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of 
Loyola (Wolff, 1997), the founder of the Society of Jesus, the 
Jesuits. I remembered how Ignatius, in the first phase of the 
retreat, instructs the retreatant to take a God’s eye view of 
the human condition, of its endless cycle of sin and suffering 
and death. That sin, I knew, was both personal and social. At 
the very least, we are all guilty of the sin of omission. 
Moreover, we are all guilty of the sin of complicity, of 
refusing to refuse to cooperate with evil—of being, in Thomas 
Merton’s memorable phrase, a guilty bystander. No one of 
any moral and spiritual sensitivity, I suspect, is immune to this 
kind of funk. 
 
But I also remembered Ignatius’ insistence, in the preliminary 
Principle and Foundation, that Creation is good, even with its 
human corruption, and that we ourselves have been created 
by God out of a love that sustains and redeems. I 
remembered what has become for me the salient insight of 
the Exercises: the appropriate human response to all that 
funk-inducing bad news is “shame and confusion.”  Indeed, 
Ignatius writes that the retreatant “must beg for shame and 
confusion” (Wolff, 1997, p. 19; the relevant paragraph is #48). 
What could be more counterintuitive? The morning-bad-
news-blues could be a gift, a grace, even though I have not 
prayed for it and even wished it would go away. If I were to 
allow myself to feel and understand this interior movement—
rather than fight it or repress it—it could become precious 
interior knowledge, and that knowledge could go deep, 
touching into an essential goodness that was, somehow, 
Jesus himself. Jesus wept over the suffering of his people, 
especially the poor and oppressed (the bad news of his day), 
tried to do something about it nonviolently, called others to 
do likewise, suffered the resistance of the Powers That Be, 
was brutally killed, but proven eternally resilient. In Christian 
perspective, the experience of shame and confusion is an 
invitation to forgiveness, liberation, and empowerment 
(Brackley, 2004). It can be the call of grace. 
 
Conclusion 
“I am beginning to feel very ashamed of myself. Not only do I 
judge the residents, but the other volunteers. While I am 
doing this they are helping each other attempt to live a 
better, more fulfilled life. As sick as I feel when I think of 
going, I am beginning to feel even worse at the idea of not 
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going” (quoted in Bergman, 2011, pp. 144-145).  I have come 
to be neither surprised nor disheartened when students 
report such painful emotions when they encounter the sin of 
the world, and their share in it, whether they call it that or 
not, and whether or not they identify their response as the 
grace of shame and confusion. Indeed, my concern would be 
raised if they did not experience some difficult emotions. The 
gritty reality of the world is like that. It raises excruciating 
questions. In the appropriate context of a community of faith 
and resistance, of what Dom Helder Camara (1982) called an 
Abrahamic minority, and with proper guidance, such 
emotions can lead to the kind of self-knowledge and 
vocational discernment that is an essential dimension of the 
Catholic university’s mission on behalf of its students. It is the 
context in which all the professions for which we prepare our 
students make ultimate sense and from which they take their 
deepest meaning. Shame in this context can be not only a 
psychologically healthy response to cultural disparagement 
(as argued by Fowler and named by Clarke), not only a semi-
virtue in the young (as identified by Aristotle and as 
embodied in the student quotation above), not only a tactic 
or strategy as suggested by Jesus, Gandhi, and Appiah, but 
also a grace (as prayed for by Ignatius). Practiced discernment 
among these types of shame is especially significant for 
advocates of justice and peace, and so finds an essential 
place in the agendas of engaging pedagogies in Catholic 
higher education.   
 
NOTE: The author wishes to thank Ben Rogers, archivist at 
Poage Library at Baylor University, where Griffin’s papers are 
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